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of importance as to the authority of the judiciary to grant relief
in actions arising under § 301(a). Initially, § 301(a) was conceived
to be merely procedural in nature for the benefit only of the signatory parties to a bargaining agreement; therefore, it seemed that
personal rights of the individual union members were unenforceable
either by the members or the union. Assn of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1954). The
principal case extends the right to enforce federal substantive law
to individual members of a union, thus, laying to rest the implications of the Westinghouse case.
In summary, recent Supreme Court decisions clearly indicate
that the pre-emption doctrine will not preclude a state court from
applying federal substantive law and thereby granting relief for
the breach of a collective bargaining agreement even though the
action complained is admittedly an unfair labor practice. The
NLRB seems to be in accord with this view as the Solicitor General by way of amicus curiae contended that to oust the courts of
jurisdiction would obstruct the purpose of national labor policy.
James K. Edmundson, Jr.
Mines and Minerals-Breach of CovenantMeasure of Damages
P, lessor under an oil and gas lease, brought this action for
an alleged breach of an express covenant to market contained in
the lease. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of P and
found the measure of damages to be the interest on the royalties
P would have received had D acted diligently. From this decision
both P and D appealed. Held, affirmed in part; reversed in part.
The judgment in favor of P was sustained but the court determined
that the proper measure of damages should be the amount of the
royalties P would have received and not merely the interest thereon. The court further decided that D would be entitled to a dollar
for dollar offset for the damages so paid when the gas was subsequently marketed. Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1962).
The principal case illustrates the difficulty that has confronted
the courts in dealing with the enforcement of an oil and gas lease.
The problem stems from the unusual nature of this type of leasing
arrangement. An oil and gas lease is in effect a hybrid instrument.
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It partakes of a true leasehold interest, a conveyance, and a contract. 2 TnThNY, Rm m PRoPERTY § 589 (1939). The offset feature
found in the principal case is unique and might result in a complete change in this area of damages.
The "interest rule" as the proper measure of damages, as followed by the trial court, was introduced in Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915). This action was
instituted for a breach of covenant for further development of the
leased premises. In the discussion of the measure of damages the
court disregarded the view that the amount of the royalties should
be awarded. To allow the entire amount of the royalties the court
concluded, would permit the lessor to receive a double payment.
This double payment would result from the fact that the oil and
gas was still in the ground and might subsequently be removed, at
which time the lessor would again receive his royalty payments.
Consequently, according to the court, the lessors had lost nothing
more than interest on the value of production obtainable had the
lessee acted with the proper degree of diligence. The principal case
in its discussion of the Grass decision called attention to the fact
that the court did not precisely and in unmistakable language hold
that the interest on the royalties should furnish the proper measure
of damages.
The royalty concept of damages was recognized in Illinois
prior to the decision in the Grass case. That court held that it was
the duty of the lessee to drill additional wells, market the products,
and pay the lessor the royalties thereon. The court further held
that it would not be a defense to an action for breach of this duty
that oil or gas was still in the ground and might be extracted at
sometime in the future by another person. Daugheteev. Ohio Oil Co.
263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914). The West Virginia court specifically considered the decision in this case when deciding the
Grass case, but failed to follow its reasoning.
The problem concerning the proper measure of damages has
also been recognized in cases dealing with coal leases. In Cawood
v. Hall Land & Mining Co., 293 Ky. 23, 168 S.W.2d 366 (1943),
the court was of the opinion that the lessee's liability for failure
to exercise due diligence in the mining of coal was not limited to
the interest on the royalties that would have been paid if the coal
had been mined, but that the lessors were entitled to recover the
amount of the royalties. The court went on to say if the "interest
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rule" were adopted the result might be an indefinite postponement
of the royalties to which the lessors were entitled. The lessor did
not contract for an indefinite investment of his royalties at interest
but for the royalties themselves.
Although dealing with the breach of a covenant to protect
against drainage, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether
the "interest rule" of the Grass case was the proper measure of
damages. In rejecting the theory of that case the court held that
the "interest rule" would be impractical in actual application because of the difficulties in fixing the period for which the interest
should be computed and also that the adoption of the rule would
invite intolerable litigation. This decision placed Texas in accord
with the jurisdictions adhering to the concept that the amount of
royalties the lessor would have received constituted the proper
measure of damages. The court went on to say, by way of dicta,
that the lessee might be able to invoke the aid of equity in such
a way as to obtain the benefit of the unmined minerals on which
the lessee had been required to pay royalties should he desire to
comply with his obligations under the lease. Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil
Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). In support of
this royalty concept and considering the contractual aspect of an
oil and gas lease, it has been stated that the purpose of the law
to give compensation for breach of contract has been complied
with by allowing the injured party to have the value of the contract's performance as damages. 5 WILLSTON, CoNmAcrs § 1338
(1937).
It is arguable that the principal case overrules the "interest
rule" and places West Virginia in line with the case law holding
that the royalties the lessor should have received would be the
measure of damages for breach of a covenant for development in
an oil and gas lease. The court, however, has added to this view
the offset feature for the benefit of the lessee. If this offset idea is
carried to a logical conclusion, it would seem that the lessee is
not being punished for breaching his obligations under the lease.
It appears that the lessee could fail to comply with the terms of his
agreement and any resulting liability could be offset by him at a
later date when he might decide to perform his obligations. In
the Grass case the court was concerned with the lessor's receiving
a double payment as a result of the lessee's breach, but under the
view of the principal case it may be argued that the lessor would
not receive any compensation for the lessee's breach.
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A possible solution to this vexing question might be to allow
the lessor the interest on the royalties in addition to the royalties
themselves. If both were given as damages the lessor would still
retain the interest in the event the lessee would take advantage of
the offset provision.
Eugene Triplett Hague, Jr.

Procedure-The Sufficiency of the Record in Opposing a
Motion for Summary Judgment
The government brought a civil antitrust suit against D, a truck
manufacturer. The principal practices charged as violations of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 3 (1958), were limitations on the territories within which distributors could sell and limitations on the
persons or classes of persons to whom they could sell. The government moved for summary judgment and filed depositions and exhibits in support of its motion. D filed a brief in opposition and alleged therein that the limitations were fair and reasonable and did
not violate the Sherman Act. D filed no affidavits, depositions, or
other evidence showing facts on which its allegations were based.
The district court granted the motion. D appealed. Held, reversed.
D made allegations concerning factual matters which were relevant
to a decision on the merits. More economic and business data from
which such limitations emerged must be shown before the court
could determine whether the arrangement stifled competition or
had any redeeming virtue. A dissenting opinion held that on the
facts presented there was no genuine issue of fact and the moving
party was entitled to a summary judgment. White Motor Co. v.
United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 696 (1963).
"While it is true that every simile limps, the motion for summary
judgment is not unlike the unveiling of a statute. The motion requires the opposition to remove the shielding cloak of formal
allegations and demonstrate a genuine issue as to a material fact."
United States v. Dollar, 100 F. Supp. 881, 884 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
This statement succinctly states the real purpose of summary judgment procedure under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C. 5177 (1958), provides, inter alia, that
a summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
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